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Summary                                   
 
‘A diplomat these days is nothing but a head waiter who is occasionally allowed to sit’,  the 
actor Peter Ustinov once quipped. The paradox is that at the height of the current phase of 
globalisation, diplomacy and diplomats were sidelined rather than recognised for their key 
roles as ‘hinges’ of this process. Will the  COVID-19 pandemic, with its cutting back on 
travel and (most likely) the budgets of ministries of foreign affairs, and the blistering 
attacks of populists on diplomats lead to their further marginalisation? Looking at the 
newly emerging role of Chinese ambassadors, this article argues that may not necessarily 
be the case. 
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1  Introduction 
 
Xu Bu, China’s Ambassador to Chile, does not conform to type. A rare exception amongst 
most of his Chinese colleagues in Latin America, he does not speak Spanish. And if he has 
been taking lessons in the language of Cervantes since his arrival in Santiago in January of 
2018, it does not show. He does not come from the Latin America Division of the Chinese 
Foreign Ministry, having served 33 years previously in Southeast Asia, UN Headquarters in 
New York, Canada and the United Kingdom. Xu is now serving in Chile{AU—Is ‘Chile’ 
correct as edited (instead of  This is wrong. “The hottest seat” refers to Venezuela. 
Please restore my original text.‘Venezuela’) for consistency with text below?}  In 
contrast to his more mild-mannered Shanghainese predecessor, Ambassador Li Barong,  
now serving in Venezuela in one of the hottest seats in Chinese diplomacy anywhere, and 
known to be quite forceful in private with his counterparts in the Chilean Foreign Ministry 





In the somewhat sleepy and overcautious diplomatic circles of Santiago, no Head of 
Mission cuts a more prominent and daring figure than Xu, who in his two-and-a-half years 
in Chile has made a name for himself (not always favourably) by standing up forcefully for 
China’s interests.2 Not even the US Ambassador to Chile has been able to cast a shadow 
over Xu’s many activities — amongst other things, because for much of Xu’s tenure that 
post has been vacant, throwing into stark relief the contrasting approaches to diplomatic 
management of Beijing and Washington these days. 
When Secretary of State Mike Pompeo visited Chile in April 2019, and gave a rousing 
speech denouncing China’s role in Latin America, Xu responded in kind, asserting in an 
interview with a leading daily that ‘Mr Pompeo has lost his head and gone too far’.3 Later 
that year a Member of Parliament (MP) from Chile’s ruling right-wing coalition, Jaime 
Bellolio, stopped over in Hong Kong after a visit to Taiwan, and met with Joshua Wong, 
the Hong Kong student leader, a meeting amply covered in the Chilean press. Xu promptly 
took to the opinion pages of El Mercurio, Chile’s newspaper of record, to object to the 
ways that Bellolio spoke about China. This led to a spirited and highly unusual exchange in 
these opinion pages between the Ambassador and the MP.4 
Perhaps the most controversial of Xu’s public interventions, though, was in April 2020, 
when he publicly contradicted Chile’s Minister of Health, Jaime Mañalich, on the matter of 
500 ventilators to be donated by China. Mañalich had asserted that Xu had committed to 
such a donation, something denied by Xu when asked by reporters. The issue dominated the 
news cycle for several days, just at a time when the curve of COVID-infected Chileans was 
climbing rapidly, and the urgency to acquire more ventilators was especially salient5  
Is it that ‘China’s diplomats have done away with diplomacy’, as the Financial Times 
put it shortly thereafter, albeit in a different context?6 Hardly. Xu is known for his 
effectiveness, and for getting things done. Shortly after his arrival, he managed to clear the 
way for a major investment by Chinese corporate giant Tianqi Lithium, one that had been 
opposed by vested interests in two different Chilean governments. Rather, much as the 
world is going through extraordinary times, so is diplomacy, now hit by the double 
whammy of populism and the pandemic.  
This tests to the limit a profession under pressure over the course of the past few 
decades. The purpose of this essay is to explore the ways in which the current global health 
crisis affects diplomatic practices. First, it considers how the rise of populism and the onset 
of the COVID-19 pandemic have wrought further havoc with an already battered activity. 
Then, it discusses the behaviour of Chinese Heads of Mission before and during the 
pandemic. Finally, it concludes with some of the ways that COVID-19 may impact 




1 Peña 2019.{AU—Per the HJD co-editors, please provide page numbers wherever possible throughout 
the footnotes, so that readers can easily find the specific points or evidence in the sources (even where 
there are not direct quotations).}  
2 “El Embajdor Xu Bu en Chile : cómo la diplomacia china se ha vuelto más opinante y agresiva”, 2020. 
3 Guerrero 2019. 
4 ‘El insólito round entre el embajador chino y el Diputado Bellolio’ 2019. 
5 Ël embajador chino vuelve a contradecir a Mañalich : No conozco el compromiso del gobierno de China de 
donar ventiladores  a Chile”, 2020. 
6 Hille 2020. 
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2  The Populist Onslaught 
 
In the United States, the United Kingdom and in several European countries, the hollowing 
out of traditional manufacturing, the rise of immigration, and the wealth shift from the 
North Atlantic to the Asia Pacific, has triggered a backlash against globalisation. This rise 
of protectionism, chauvinism and nativism has gone hand in hand with a pronounced 
hostility towards those denounced as the handmaidens of globalism. Cosmopolitan elites, 
and most prominently diplomats, seen as facilitators and enablers of these trends are 
amongst the main targets of such movements.7 This has come to highlight what Andrew F. 
Cooper refers to as ‘the disintermediation dilemma’: ‘diplomacy both as an institution — 
with an emphasis on the conduct of international relations — and in terms of mode of 
operation — a focus on means such as embassies — remains contested and stigmatized’.8 
In the United States, there has been a veritable ‘war on peace’ undertaken by the Donald 
Trump Administration on the State Department, sometimes referred to by President Trump 
as the ‘Deep State Department’. Three years into his presidency, one-third of all senior 
positions remain unfilled.9 The impeachment hearings held in the United States House of 
Representatives in late 2019 and early 2020 were largely focused on the removal by the 
White House of the United States Ambassador to Ukraine, Marie Yovanovitch.10 In the 
United Kingdom, the Ambassador to the European Union first and the Ambassador to the 
United States later were forced into abrupt resignations, having been put in untenable 
situations by manoeuvrings and/or lack of support by the leaders of the Brexit movement. 
In Brazil, the appointment by President Jair Bolsonaro of a middle-ranking diplomat as 
Foreign Minister was widely seen as an attempt to humiliate the prestigious Brazilian 
Foreign Ministry, colloquially known as Itamaraty. It is only fierce pushback from the 
military that has avoided the implementation of foreign policy measures like moving the 
Brazilian Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, leaving the Brazil, Russia, India, China and 
South Africa (BRICS) group, or cutting back trade and investment links with China that 
would have undone decades of painstaking diplomatic efforts on the part of Brazil. In an 
unprecedented move, half a dozen former Foreign Ministers from across the political 
spectrum signed a letter denouncing the mishandling of Brazilian foreign policy.11 
Their seeming to be ‘out of touch’, their command of foreign languages and their living 
(by definition) abroad for long periods of time make diplomats easy targets of populists 
bent on vindicating the values of Blut und Boden. It is also what makes foreign ministries to 
be first on the list of budgetary cutbacks when it comes to fiscal belt-tightening by the new 
champions of nativism. In so doing, they express the widespread view of the likes of former 
US presidential candidate Ross Perot, who said ‘Embassies are relics from days of sailing 
ships. At one time, when you had no world communication, your ambassador spoke for you 
in that country. But now, with international communication around the world, the 
ambassador is primarily in a social role’.12 
 
 
7 Cooper 2019. 
8 Cooper 2019, 800. 
9 Farrow 2018; Burns 2019. 
10 Fleishman 2019. 
11 Cardoso et al. 2020.  




3  Diplomacy in a Post-COVID-19 Era  
 
As Albert Camus observes in The Plague: ‘There have been as many plagues as wars in 
history, yet always wars and plagues take people equally by surprise’.13 Still, there should 
have been nothing surprising about it. In 2017 Bill Gates, in a speech to the Munich 
Security Conference, said that the three biggest threats to humanity were climate change, 
nuclear war and pandemics. In 2015, President Barack Obama predicted that the next global 
pandemic would hit the world in 2019.   
 “Major crises have major consequences, usually unforeseen” , in the words of Francis 
Fukuyama.14The pandemic might have been an opportunity to bring the world together. 
Enhancing international cooperation in the face of such an insidious enemy as the 
coronavirus could have been a natural outcome, given the enormity of the challenge. In 
fact, there was a close precedent to such a situation. In 2008 in the midst of the financial 
crisis, President George W. Bush called the first meeting of the Group of 20, held in the 
White House on 18 November of that year 12 
Yet nothing of the sort has occurred on this occasion15 If anything, the biggest health 
crisis in more than a century brought out the worst out of various international players, 
underlining the enormous lack of foresight of some of the big powers, as well as a 
remarkable incapacity to manage the pandemic, with tragic consequences, a matter that this 
author has dealt with elsewhere.16 
In this context, what are diplomats to do? How will the management of international 
affairs evolve in years to come? 
As Shaun Riordan points out, diplomats have quickly adapted to ‘diplomacy in the time 
of pandemic’, using the full potential of tools like Zoom, including things such as breakout 
rooms and other modalities that facilitate the sort of informal exchanges within formal 
meetings that are such an essential part of the craft.17 Yet one of the most fascinating 
aspects of the effect of COVID-19 on diplomacy has been the interface between disease 
management and statecraft. A critical element for contact tracing is, of course, data from 
mobile phones. The building of data banks, of big data analysis, and to do this not just on a 
national but an international basis have led to the generation of new platforms, which need 
suitable diplomatic management.18 
There is no doubt that many of these newly developed diplomatic practices are here to 
stay. As social distancing and travel restrictions remain in place, the tools of digital 
diplomacy will gain wider currency and will presumably displace the last traditionalist 
holdouts in ministries of foreign affairs (MFAs), and the notion that the diplomatic cable is 
the only ‘tried and true’ instrument of statecraft. 
A different question is the role that Heads of Mission and diplomats more generally will 
play in this new environment. From cutting travel to conferences to cutting manpower in 
 
13 Camus 1991.{AU—Please provide a reference in Bibliography for Camus 1991 citation.} 
14 Fukuyama, 2020. 
15 Patrick, 2020 
12 Cooper and Thakur, 2012. 
16 Heine 2020. 
17 Riordan 2020. 
18 Riordan 2020. 
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missions, and even the latter altogether, is only a short step, and the matter is already being 
pondered in several countries. For some time now, the notion that, given current 
communications technology, Ambassadors should be little more than elevated messengers 
for whatever MFA headquarters want to convey, if any ⸺ as some matters can be dealt 
with directly from MFA to MFA, without intermediaries ⸺ has been around. The broader 
question of representation brought up by Paul Sharp some years ago, in his article, ‘Who 
Needs Diplomats?’ has thus come under renewed focus, given the current attacks of 
populists in the West against diplomats.19 This might lead to a further capitis diminutio of 
their standing. Keeping your head down has been a traditional mode of survival in ossifying 
bureaucracies. 
Yet there is a different approach, one that empowers Heads of Mission and diplomats 
more generally, that has received a renewed impetus after the outbreak of the COVID-19 
pandemic. This refers to China’s approach, one that reflects a deft deployment of 
diplomacy for the purposes of international change management20The assertive behaviour 
of Ambassador Xu in Chile, mentioned above, is by no means an exception. In the past few 
years but especially in the course of 2020, Chinese diplomats have gone out of their way to 
stake out Chinese positions through social and traditional media, in Latin America where 
they can be found in sixteen countries, and in the rest of the world. This is a change from 
the staid, low-key, if not downright wooden, style of past Chinese Ambassadors, so well 
described in her book on the subject by Liu Xiaohong.21 Building on Liu’s categories, we 
could posit that this, the sixth generation of Chinese Ambassadors, has taken to Twitter like 
ducks to water.22 And they have been especially active in defending China’s position in the 
evolving debates on the pandemic, which has accelerated this and other previous trends. 
No shrinking violets, they have not stopped from questioning even government officials, 
as they did with Eduardo Bolsonaro, the son of Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro, when he 
blamed China for the coronavirus spread.23 In so doing, Chinese diplomats express the 
more assertive foreign policy style of President Xi Jinping, who has brought to bear a very 
different approach from the one recommended by Deng Xiaoping, of ‘biding your time and 
nurturing your strength’ (taogang yanghui), followed during the Presidencies of Jiang 
Zemin (1992–2002) and Hu Jintao (2002–2012). Under the Xi Presidency, China has 
significantly increased its presence abroad, being ranked in 2019 as the country with the 
highest number of posts abroad, including 169 embassies, 96 general consulates and 8 
permanent missions.24 
It also embraces what has been referred to as the newly minted Wolf Warrior  
(Zhanlang) diplomacy of the Chinese MFA.25 The latter was seen for long as a ‘weak 
sister’ amongst the Chinese ministries, carrying less clout than heavyweights such as the 
National Development and Reform Commission or the Ministry of Commerce. Yet at a 
time when the Chinese are ‘no longer satisfied with a flaccid diplomatic tone’,26 the MFA, 
encouraged by a 2019 handwritten message to diplomats by President Xi to show ‘a greater 
 
19 Sharp 1997. 
20 Holmes, 2015. 
21 Liu 2001. 
22 Youkee 2020. 
23 Stuenkel 2020. 
24 Lowy Institute 2019. 
25 Zhu 2020. 
26 ‘West Feels Challenged by China’s Wolf Warrior Diplomacy’ 2020. 
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fighting spirit’, has switched from its earlier cautious bureaucratic behaviour to a much 
more outgoing one. Zhao Lijian, one of the ministries’ Twitter stars, and number 3 at the 
Chinese Embassy in Islamabad, was promoted to a MFA spokesperson on his return to 
Beijing. 
Throughout Latin America, but also in Europe, Africa and Asia, in 2020 Chinese 
diplomats have thus taken to the media front lines with brio. In Europe, some observers 
opine that Chinese diplomats have overplayed their hand, and triggered pushback.27 But 
this is by no means the rule elsewhere.  
In Latin America where China has had an increased presence in the course of the new 
century, the pandemic, as in other areas, has accelerated the trend for more outgoing and 
assertive Heads of Missions, pushed to the forefront to defend China’s role in the health 
crisis. Yang Wanming, China’s Ambassador to Brazil, served previously in Argentina and 
in Chile, dealing with complex issues in all three countries, while developing a high media 
profile and much goodwill. Something similar can be said about Wei Qiang, the Chinese 
Ambassador in Panama, and avid Twitter user. He is amongst the most popular Heads of 
Mission in Panama City, and strikes quite a presence with his debonair ways and 
impeccable Spanish and English.28 
In empowering diplomats in this way, China has grasped that in today’s media-driven 
societies, there is no substitute for an articulate spokesperson on the ground, representing 
his or her country, standing up for it, engaging local public opinion in a variety of ways and 
practicing network diplomacy. And the frantic, real-time pace of social media demands 
wide latitude for diplomats. There is no way Beijing, nine time zones away, can aspire to 
tell Wei what to respond to a tweet, or how to react to the latest Panamanian headline 
involving China. 
Moreover, the Chinese MFA seems to thrive in the chaotic frenzy of the Twittersphere 
and the 24-hour news cycle. Reflecting generational differences between the old guard and 
the young and upcoming ‘twiplomats’ in the ministry,  the Chinese Ambassador to the 
United States, Cui Tankai, publicly contradicted in an interview the statements by Zhao 
Lijian, the MFA spokesperson.29 This would have cost the job of at least one of them in 
most other foreign ministries but it did not seem to harm their standing. 
 
 
4   Conclusion  
 
Some years ago, this author wrote that there was a great paradox in the fact that, at the 
height of the current phase of globalisation, diplomacy and diplomats were not getting the 
recognition they deserved for their roles as ‘hinges’ of that process that had brought so 
much progress to the world, underlining that they found themselves in a transition from 
‘club’ to ‘network’ diplomacy.30 Today, the backlash against globalisation expressed in the 
rise of populism in the West has brought in its wake renewed attacks on diplomats, 
denounced as enablers of that process. The COVID-19 pandemic, in turn, has come to 
question many of the established modus operandi of contemporary statecraft. The virtual 
 
27 Crawford and Martin 2020. 
28 Youkee 2020. 
29 Martin 2020. 
30 Heine 2013. 
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inexistence of international cooperation in confronting the disease has also reflected the 
crisis of multilateral diplomacy. 
Yet a change in the role of Ambassadors and diplomats more generally is in the offing. 
After decades of minimisation of their role and steady encroachment of other actors into the 
diplomatic field, China is taking the lead in doing something different. Against the 
observed trend in the Anglosphere to turn Ambassadors into veritable ‘punching bags’ to 
score domestic political points, and contra Ross Perot, China has grasped that in today’s 
media-driven societies, the Ambassador is not ‘primarily in a social role’ but in a 
substantive one. Thus, for some years now but especially during this pandemic, China has 
been empowering Ambassadors, putting them front and centre in its foreign policy 
projection. This has given them a very different profile from the diffident, withdrawn 
persona that has been the hallmark of diplomats since the days of Maurice de Talleyrand. It 
has also taken traditionalists by surprise, especially in the Old Continent. But it may yet 
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